Abstract. Problems in two axiomatizations of Jaśkowski's discussive (or discursive) logic D2 are considered. A recent axiomatization of D2 and completeness proof relative to D2's intended semantics seems to be mistaken because some formulas valid according to the intended semantics turn out to be unprovable. Although no new axiomatization is offered, nor a repaired completeness proof given, the shortcomings identified here may be a step toward an improved axiomatization.
Introduction
Jaśkowski's discussive (or discursive) logic is a paraconsistent logic of opinions. The idea is that it is one thing is a reasoner contradicts himself; it is quite another for two reasoners to contradict one another. The latter is an everyday phenomenon that is all too familiar, but difficult to justify from the standard logical standpoint, which accepts "explosion principles" such as ex contradictione quodlibet ((p ∧ ∼ p) → q. The idea is that an opinion, on its own, is to be understood as consistent (in the logical sense of the term), but might conflict with other opinions. It is one thing if a speaker contradicts himself; it is another if two speakers hold conflicting opinions. We recognize the former as leading to a kind of incoherence; the latter is not necessarily incoherent, but perhaps calls for resolution of conflict.
Jaśkowski did not offer an axiomatization of his new logic. His contribution was to formulate the problem of giving a rigorous account of a certain paraconsistent discursive phenomenon. He spent much of his attention on a discussion of the notion of paraconsistency and its justification from the standard non-paraconsistent point of view. Axiomatizations came later.
In a recent paper [2] , Ciuciura takes issue with an axiomatization, D (due to da Costa, Dubikajtis, and Kotas [1, 4, 3] ) of D2. He points out two axioms of D that are not valid in the intended semantics of D2. To repair the difficulties, Ciuciura gave a new axiomatization, C, of D2 and
Dueling axiomatizations
For the sake of completeness, below are two axiomatizations in the language ∼ (negation), ∨ (disjunction), → d (discussive implication), and ∧ d (discussive conjunction). The first batch is due to da Costa, Dubikajtis, and Kotas and is, for short, called simply "D"; the second batch is due to Ciuciura and is called "C". Both C and D use modus ponens (for discussive implication) as their sole rule of inference. The axiom lists are simply repeated from [2] (to more clearly distinguish the two axiom systems, we use the "C" and "D" prefixes, whereas Ciuciura used the prefix "A" for both sets of axioms). The axiom sets are given schematically; Greek letters are variables ranging over formulas.
We now turn to Ciuciura's axiomatization.
2. Non-equivalence of the axiomatizations Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 1) over the three truth values {1, 2, 3} for → d , ∧ d , ∨, and ∼:
We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 3 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 2 are unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices ( Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 3) : We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 4) : We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices ( 1  3  3  2  1  2  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  3  3  3  1  1  3  1  3  2  2  3  1  3  3  3  3  1   Table 4 . Matrices validating C in which D14 is invalid is the same as the one appearing in Table 1 . We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 3 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 2 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 6 ): We then declare that any formula having the values 2, 3, or 4 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 1 declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 7) : The matrix for negation is the same as the one used in Table 3 . We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices ( Table 6 . Matrices validating C in which D16 is invalid any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 9 ): We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 10 ): We then declare that any formula having the values 2 or 3 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 1 are declared to be unprovable. Table 7 . Matrices validating C in which D17 is invalid 2  2  2  1  1  3  1  3  3  2  1  1  2  1  2  2  1  1  1  2  3  2  3  3  3  1  1  3  2  3  2  2  3  2  3  3  3  3  2   Table 8 . Matrices validating C in which D18 is invalid. The matrix for negation is the same as the one appearing in Table 4 .
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 11) : We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 12 ): We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
S5-(in)validities among the D axioms
Section 2.1 presents several axiom (schemes) of D cannot be proved in C (that is, for each of several of D's axiom schemes, at least one instance of the scheme is not provable in C). As pointed out by Ciuciura, the fact that some of these theorems are invalid according to the intended semantics shows that their C-unprovability is to be expected (with the understanding, 1  1  2  1  1  1  2  2  1  1  1  3  1  3  3  2  1  1  2  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  3  2  3  3  3  1  1  3  2  3  2  2  3  1  3  3  3  3  1   Table 9 . Matrices validating C in which D19 is invalid. The matrix for negation is the same as the one appearing in Table 4 . 1  1  2  1  2  2  1  3  1  3  3  1  2  2  1  2  1  1  2  2  3  2  3  2  3  3  2  2  3  1  3  1  1  3  2  3  2  2  3  3  2  3  2   Table 10 . Matrices validating C in which D20 is invalid of course, that C is supposed to be an axiomatization of D2). But it is too quick to conclude that this diagnosis applies to all of the C-unprovable axioms of D. Indeed, some of sentences appearing in Proposition 2.1-2.12 are in fact valid in the intended semantics of D2. Table 13 separates the two.
Proposition 2.13. If φ and ψ are S5-valid formulas such that φ ↔ ψ is a tautology, then ♦(♦φ → ψ) is S5-valid.
Proof. Consider an S5-model M = (W, R, V ) (a triple of a non-empty set of worlds, an equivalence relation, and a function from atoms to sets of worlds) and a world w in W . If u ψ for every world u accessible from w, then (since R is reflexive) we have
trivially. Suppose, then, that u is a world accessible from w for which u ψ. Then, since φ ↔ ψ is a tautology, u φ as well. Since R is reflexive, we have that u ♦φ as well as u ♦φ → ψ. Thus 
Theorems of C unprovable in D (
The following section is a digression from the main line of investigation but is included for the sake of completeness.) Section 2.1 lists many axioms of D that are unprovable in D. Ciuciura singled out D 19 and D 22 as invalid in the intended semantics for D2, and thus ought to be missing from an axiomatization. One might suspect that the way out is to restrict D: throw out the axioms that are not valid in the intended semantics, but keep the rest (possibly reformulated in a more perspicuous way). On this line of reasoning, one expects to find that every axiom of C is provable in D (though one hopes that the axioms D 19 and D 22 singled out by Ciuciura are avoided). But this is not so: one finds that Ciuciura's axiomatization C is not simply a restriction of D. It turns out that (at least) one axiom of C is unprovable in D. Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 14) : We then declare that any formula having the values 2, 3, or 4 according to these tables is provable; formulas having value 1 declared to be unprovable.
